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The aim of this paper is to grasp the processes underlying the genesis and assessment of synergies in M&A deals. 
We proceed to an in-depth scrutiny of the foundations of synergies using Porter’s model of the value chain. A 
discernment of the nature of synergies and the mode of their emergence is helpful to clarify to what extent and 
under which boundary conditions it is appropriate to apply the DCF or the real option techniques for evaluating 
each type of synergy. Combining both financial tools, the methodology suggested for evaluating the synergies is 
able to: evaluate projects of M&As, orient the selection of target firms and the definition of the premium of 
acquisition, and drive the integration processes.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent decades, M&A research in managerial 
literature and corporate finance studies has 
developed rapidly. These advances include a 
handful of ideas about the nature, antecedents, and 
economic and financial impact of business 
combinations (Meglio and Capasso, 2012). 
However, the debate about the shareholder value 
creation of businesses combinations has resulted in 
partial and inconsistent conclusions (Haleblian et 
al., 2009). Mapping the main studies, 
institutionalized streams, and dominant theoretical 
explanations, Ismail et al. (2011) concluded that 
research on the effect of M&A on abnormal returns 
for both acquiring and acquired firms is 
inconclusive (Tse and Soufani, 2001; Andre, Kooli 
and L’Her, 2004; Choi and Russell, 2004; 
Megginson et al., 2004; Yook, 2004); similarly, 
studies that use accounting-based measures show 
contradictory positions (Ghosh, 2002; Heron and 
Lie, 2002; Ramaswamy and Waegelein, 2003). In 
addition, King et al. (2004) indicated that 
unidentified variables may explain the significant 
variance in post-acquisition performance. 
Moreover et al. (2008) found a path linking 
integration process performance to long-term firm 
results via synergy achievement.  
In approaching the topic of M&A performance, 
Sirower (1997) argued that the key to 
understanding the dynamics underlying the 
performance of M&A is the comparison between 
the amount of premium of acquisition (that is 
negotiated between the parties) and the value of 
synergies that a business combination generates.  
The choice to acquire a firm or merge with 
another firm should result from a well-developed 
corporate strategy (Payne, 1987). Conversely, the 
lack of understanding of the nature and sources of 
synergies and their appropriate evaluation results 
in exceeding the reservation price and leads to the 
“synergy trap” (Sirower, 1997) i.e., a downward 
spiral that involves the progressive and incremental 
destruction of wealth. More in detail, the 
mechanisms underlying the “synergy trap” are (a) 
the improper transfer of resources from 
stockholders of the acquiring firm to shareholders 
of the target, (b) increase in risk-seeking behavior 
and baring-risk by management and the pressure to 
recover from poor performance following the 
completion of the transaction, and (c) the negative 
effects and costs associated with drainage of 
financial resources that are vital to supporting the 
initial integration processes and operational 
strategic business combinations. 
Taking into account that the acquisition 
premium plays a key role in M&A performance 
(Sirower, 1997; Krishnan et al., 2007), and 
continuous need of practitioners to obtain results 
that can be helpful to manage M&A processes 
(Very, 2011), the object of this paper is to discern 
the main variables that are instrumental in creating 
or destroying value in M&A deals in the process of 
synergy evaluation. First, we examine the 
procedural aspects - operational, functional, 
organizational, and strategic - that are the basis of 
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value creation in M&A deals. Successively, we 
categorize the various sources of synergy and how 
best to evaluate each of them. Therefore, we 
develop a methodology to assess the synergy value 
that is the result of a path of research that lies at the 
intersection of strategic management and corporate 
finance. We address the need to integrate valuation 
tools from corporate finance and principles from 
the fields of strategic management to better 
understand value creation in financial markets 
(Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004; Sirower and Sahni, 
2006). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section two 
aims to clarify the concept of synergy. In section 
three, using Porter’s value chain as a conceptual 
support, we conduct a detailed investigation of the 
sources of synergies in the operations of M&A. In 
section four, we classify the various sources of 
synergies previously identified on the basis of the 
degree of predictability. We then discuss the 
scheme guide in the choice of valuation techniques 
for each class of synergies. In section five, we 
present synthetic formulas for evaluating synergies 
in M&A. Section six offers conclusions, 
underscoring the problem of the appropriation of 
synergy value.  
 
2. CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
The term “synergy” comes from the Greek word 
synergía or synérgeia; in turn, this word is derived 
from synergo. From an etymological perspective, 
the roots of the word synergy are syn (“with, 
together”) and ergo (“act”). Synergy concerns the 
results of different factors taken together versus a 
sum of the factors.  
From an etymological point of view, the 
concept of synergy possesses a neutral meaning: 
the joint effect of two or more factors is different 
from their simple sum. Consequently, the synergy 
value may be positive, if a combination of factors 
improves the effectiveness of actions alone, or 
negative, if the result of joint action of two or more 
factors is less than their simple sum. 
Generally, the justification of M&A operations 
is the intention to create positive synergies. It 
means that the value of the business combination is 
assumed expected to be greater than the value of 
the two firms considered independently: 
[1] BAAB WWW  , 
[2] SWWW BAAB  , 
where WAB is the value of business 
combination, WA and WB are respectively the 
values of firms A and B, and S is the value of the 
synergies emerging from the combination.  
However, as already mentioned, the empirical 
studies regarding the results of M&A operations 
show high variability (Hitt et al., 2001); therefore, 
it is also important to consider the possibility that 
negative synergies emerge.  
[3] BAAB WWW  , 
[4] SWWW BAAB  . 
Only detailed strategic planning and hardnosed 
economic assessment of the costs and benefits 
entitled by post-acquisition operational processes 
can provide the necessary basis for a rational 
estimate of the potential synergies entailed by 
specific M&A operations. This evaluation, 
therefore, entails the integration of perspectives 
and techniques from the field of both strategy and 
finance. It needs bringing strategy back into 
financial systems of measurement (Mocciaro Li 
Destri et al., 2012). Essentially, the generation of 
synergies is linked with corporate growth, 
increased market power, and greater profitability 
(Alexandridis et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
assessment of synergies implies estimating the 
“strategic fit” (Shelton, 1988), and, successively, 
shareholders’ value creation. Actually, paying a 
high acquisition premium is often a measure of 
low-quality decision making (Laamanen, 2007).  
The breakings down of the acquisition value 
and of the synergy value have been analyzed in the 
finance literature (Massari, 1998; Zanetti, 2000). 
On the basis of Massari and Zanetti's models, the 
formulation of a measurement method should 
include three types of synergies. The first type, 
incremental cash flow synergies (SF), concerns the 
cash flows that the business combination generates 
according to a plan of integration. The second type 
of synergies is related to flexibility. The real 
options synergies (SO) concern how the business 
combination increases the firms’ capability to 
respond to the evolution of the competitive 
environment. Actually, real options analysis has 
progressively emerged as a pivotal methodology to 
assess investment opportunities when the 
environments are characterized by high levels of 
uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). This 
synergy, thus, aims to capture the flexibility value 
resulting from the firm’s adaptive capabilities 
(Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004). Finally, the third type 
of synergies regards the change of the firms’ risk 
profile (SR) as a result of the operation of M&A.  
Moving from the conceptual break-down of the 
notion of synergies in M&A operations, it becomes 
apparent those in order to aid managerial 
evaluations there is the necessity and classify the 
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sources of different classes of synergies and, 
further, elaborate specific evaluation techniques for 
each class of synergies.  
 In synthetic terms, the equity value of the 
synergies will be calculated as follows:  
[5] ROF SSSS  . 
Therefore, the estimated value of a business 
combination - assuming the DCF in asset 
perspective - ideally consists of the following 
elements: 
[6] ABROFBBAAAB ΔDSSS)]DW()DW[(W  . 
Where: 
- AW  e DA represent the value of the assets 
and the value of debt for the firm A; 
- BW  e DB represent the value of the assets 
and the value of debt for the firm B; 
- FS , OS e RS  indicate the estimated value 
of synergies classified as above; and 
- ABD  Indicates the change in value of 
total debt.  
 Simplistically, we can rewrite the [6] 
formula as:  
[7] )ΔDD(D)SSS()WW(W ABBAROFBAAB  . 
The formula [7] asks an effort to categorize the 
synergies in FS , OS e RS  on the basis of the nature 
and the mode to emerge of them.  
 
3. THE GENESIS OF SYNERGIES IN M&A 
OPERATIONS 
 
In this section, we identify the various sources of 
potential synergies in M&A operations. Using 
Porter's model of the value chain (Porter, 1985) as 
a conceptual support to investigate the processes of 
structural integration between firms, we analyze 
the operational and strategic impact of M&A deals. 
By following this practice, we aim to give a 
twofold contribution. On one hand, we underscore 
the integration priorities “that should precisely 
match the value and type of synergies that drove 
the deal in the first place” (Ficery et al., 2007). In 
this perspective, the aim of the analysis is to find 
profit-making opportunities (Bruner, 2004). 
Actually, our analysis shows the foundations of 
sustained competitive advantages generated by 
potential synergies (Gruca, Nath and Mehara, 
1997). On the other hand, for each of the identified 
sources of synergy, we discuss its nature in order 
to support the subsequent of synergy evaluation.  
  
 
 
  
Fig. 1: Conceptual scheme for identifying potential synergies in M&A deals (Payne, 1987) 
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3.1. Synergies Generated in the Procurement 
and Logistics Functions 
 
The first class of synergies arising from the 
functions in question concerns the reduction of 
transaction costs generated by the upstream 
integration of production of one or more inputs. 
The choices of make or buy (Williamson, 1971; 
Perry, 1989; Grant, 1996) not only depend on the 
cost of buying the goods, but also on the costs of 
research and selection of the suppliers, the costs of 
negotiating contract terms, the costs of sending 
orders, controlling cost, the costs of the receipt of 
materials, the cost of controlling the quality of 
goods, administrative costs and, the costs of the 
settlement of payments. 
Moreover, vertical integration can generate 
synergies in the supply of technological goods. 
Perry (1989) underscored that interdependence 
between phases of the supply chain can reduce the 
use of some production inputs.  
In addition, synergies can be achieved as a 
stochastic increasing return in the management of 
raw materials. Unit costs of maintenance of raw 
materials, namely those generated by retention and 
storage of goods (financial charges, insurance 
charges, storage charges resulting from the risks, 
expenses and charges related to the additional 
space handling) are almost identical ex ante and ex 
post merger or acquisition. However, the optimal 
quantities of raw materials stored in warehouses to 
minimize the risk of running out of stock cost, in 
the case of homogeneity of raw materials between 
firms, it can be reduced for the effect of stochastic 
increasing returns (law of large number).  
The last type of potential synergies related to 
procurement stem from the increase in bargaining 
power with suppliers. Often, the business 
combination reduces the number of buyers, raises 
the volume bought and, therefore, poses the basis 
for the reduction of procurement costs. The 
emergence of these synergies should not be taken 
for granted in every operation of M&A and for 
each supplier; in fact, it is important that we reach 
a critical size to gain significant bargaining power. 
We need to estimate the probability of obtaining 
favorable terms and the amount of benefits that 
suppliers may grant.  
 
3.2. Synergies Generated in the Production 
Function 
 
M&As can generate synergies related to increased 
efficiency thanks to the new dimension reached by 
the business combination. First of all, horizontal 
M&As - i.e., between firms operating in the same 
industry – may consent the rationalization of the 
production process, reaching a production capacity 
that is optimal given industry dynamics and 
technical aspects (such as the efficient use of 
establishments or the minimum efficient scale) 
(Capron, 1999). 
A second class of potential synergies related to 
the production function includes all sources of 
economies of scale (Scherer, 1980; Gold, 1981; 
Hill, 1988). Achieving economies of scale plays a 
very important theoretical justification in M&As, 
because they generate strong differences in 
competitiveness between firms. Economies of 
scale arise when the return of the production 
function increases with the size of the production 
plant (Collis and Montgomery, 1997). The 
emergences of economies of scale imply a 
reduction of average unitary production costs when 
production increases (Lambrecht, 2004). Possible 
sources of the basic achievements of economies of 
scale (Zattoni, 2000) are: 
a. the geometrical properties of some plants. 
Cash flows generated from this synergy are 
estimated with reasonable objectivity (i.e., flows 
on the basis of differential) by technicians and 
production engineers; 
b. indivisibility of some inputs. M&As may 
help balance the production line. Bringing the flow 
of production to a level equal to the lowest 
common multiple of the capacity of each machine. 
The cash flows generated by this class of synergies 
are also simple to estimate for technicians and 
production engineers. In addition, when it is 
possible to dismiss one or more plants, it is 
appropriate to evaluate the flow of revenues 
resulting from their sale; 
c. stochastic increasing returns in the 
management of stocks (finished and semi-
finished). These synergies are due to the fact that, 
the amount of inventory with unforeseen needs is 
less than the sum of stocks that firms previously 
kept in their stores; and 
d. similar considerations concern the reduction 
of reserve capacity for the case of an unpredicted 
increase of the number of customers served. In this 
case, the evaluation needs to take into account 
maintenance costs (operational and financial) of 
spare capacity multiplied by the reduction of spare 
capacity; 
e. in theory, the synergies include the increase 
of the statistical regularity that allows a more 
efficient use of larger plants. Generally, however, 
this impact is unimportant.  
The last class of synergies regards the scope 
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economies connected to the production function, 
the value of which is relevant in the operations of 
related diversification. Similarly to scale 
economies, they generate cost saving flows.  
 
3.3. Synergies Generated in the Marketing 
Function 
 
Firms may implement M&As in order to realize a 
strategy of market domination and to create new 
competitive conditions. Actually, M&A is an 
efficacy tool to rapidly expand market share in an 
industry. In this regard, however, it seems 
appropriate to underscore synergies related to 
reduction of competitive pressure are, taken on 
their own, often insufficient to make the operation 
of M&A profitable. In fact, Salant et al. (1983) 
showed that, in absence of other synergies, the 
horizontal merger between firms that use a game 
scheme à la Cournot is not profitable for the 
business combination, while it creates benefits for 
the remaining outside firms (the exceptions are 
cases in which M&A deals involve almost all firms 
originally active in the market). 
The synergies resulting from the increased 
market power stem from: 
- the possibility of raising prices; and  
- the reduction of marketing costs due to the 
decrease in competition. 
However, M&A deals are often intended as a 
tool to defend the competitive position achieved. In 
this case, the M&A aims to eliminate a firm, 
although it is not a direct competitor, in order to 
preempt it from launching an aggressive strategy in 
the future. In this case, the evaluation of synergies 
considers the differential increased cost in 
advertising or reduction in product prices under the 
hypothesis that the M&A had not been conducted.  
When an M&A extends the business portfolio 
and the scope economies of marketing, these 
synergies can play an important role in 
determining the operations’ performance. The 
concept is very close to the above-mentioned 
economies of scale applied to the production 
function. Often, to ensure the development of the 
firm, it may need to add different categories of 
products to its portfolio, thus extending its product 
range. In this sense, M&A operations may 
represent a vehicle to grasp the strategic option of 
entering a related market and, simultaneously, 
exploiting the advantages of brand loyalty through 
brand extension. Obviously, these synergies are 
even more significant when the acquired firm is 
“anonymous,” but operationally sufficiently 
complete (Roedder and Loken, 1993). In addition 
to brand scope economies, brand extension 
strategies may enhance the brand equity of origin. 
Often this strategy clarifies, strengthens, or widens 
the scope of the brand of origin, increasing market 
coverage, and revitalizing the sales of the brand 
(Keller, 2003).  
However, the extension of the brand into 
another market can have negative effects for two 
reasons. First, it may create confusion in consumer 
preferences. Second, products made by the 
acquired (or merged) firm may fail to satisfy a 
quality level traditionally connected to the brand. 
In such cases, the brand extension may generate a 
negative effect on the image of the parent brand 
(Reddy et al., 1994; Martinez and Pina, 2003; 
Zimmer and Bhat, 2004).  
If the synergies emerging from process of brand 
extension are considered to derive from the 
M&As’ value, then it must be considered as an 
investment with a highly uncertain probability of 
effective realization. Conversely, if the effects of 
the brand extension are only a reduction in 
communication costs, synergies can be evaluated 
in terms of investment flows by considering their 
differential levels. 
In addition, the marketing function can generate 
synergies in relation to the development of 
multiple brands. Multiple brand strategy allows 
companies to obtain more display space and 
greater negotiation power with distribution firm. 
These benefits should be carefully scrutinized, as 
excessive use of multiple brands sparking off a 
process of “cannibalization” between brands. In 
this case, the business combination dissipates its 
resources through a many-brand-sided 
development, rather than focusing on a few brands 
with high levels of profitability (Kotler, 1992).  
Marketing synergies can also be connected to 
sharing retail networks. M&As may consent the 
access of new distribution channels (Mocciaro Li 
Destri and Minà, 2009, 2010), thus allowing to 
reach different customer segments, or overcome 
barriers to entry in certain markets.  
Finally, synergies related to the marketing 
function may emerge from the rationalization of 
the marking workforce. These synergies are typical 
in M&As that aim to expand the geographic 
extension of the business portfolio. Divisions of 
the new business combination that overlap in one 
area, lead to the reduction of costs through the 
elimination of duplicate facilities and personnel 
redundancies. 
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3.4. Synergies Generated in the Organization 
Function 
 
The integration of structures of the business 
combination should ensure a desirable level of 
both autonomy and coordination to the different 
divisions. It is necessary to make decisions about 
how to distribute authority positions within the 
renewed organization, redesigning new tasks and 
projects, including temporary teams. Human 
resource management will focus first on 
identifying workers who will remain part of the 
business combination and, eventually on new 
training. The organizational synergies amount to 
the savings cost generated by fining redundant. 
During the initial period, however, the net 
investment required for the preparation of 
organizational conditions for harmonization of 
technical aspects must be consider.  
Dismissal policies need particular attention. 
The rationalization of corporate structures involves 
both workers at the lower and middle level of the 
organizational pyramid. In fact, sharing technical, 
administrative and support activities often implies 
making a part of the employees, redundant (or 
relocating them). Finally, restructuring human 
resources also involves middle and top 
management. Often, a significant part of them are 
excluded from new structures of corporate 
governance. The policies of worker’s dismissal are 
generate uncertainty and stress in human resources. 
Under these conditions, they tend to reduce their 
levels of activity and productivity.  
Last but not least, we underscore that excessive 
growth in size leads to phenomena of free-riding: 
Each worker is potentially less controllable, and 
this might be an incentive to contribute less than 
required. In fact, when the span of control 
increases, there is the need to create several 
hierarchical levels that can however increase both 
the costs and the level of rigidity of the 
organizational structure.  
 
3.5. Synergies Generated in the R&D Function 
 
Before introducing the analysis of the synergies 
that may emerge in R&D function, it is useful to 
point out that although the operations of M&A are 
a tool to enhance the capacity to access patented 
innovations, the performance of this process does 
not constitute a synergy. Actually, the same value 
creation effect could be obtained simply by 
licensing patent (namely, accessing the knowledge 
patented through licenses). 
The first class of synergies in the R&D function 
stems from reaching a size which is critical in 
order to join a network of firms, as complex 
dynamic systems of knowledge and capabilities 
(Dagnino et al., 2008), considered effective in 
terms of innovation. The importance of such 
relationships for the conquest and defense of 
competitive advantages is related to the integration 
of complementary skills between different firms 
(for instance, Saxenian, 1994; Powell et al., 1996; 
Basile, 2012). Synergies arise from the entrance in 
a network of real options with low exercise 
probability, the value of which depends on their 
contribution to the network in generating 
innovation, the probability of technological 
success, and the likelihood of commercial success. 
The actual realization of synergies related to 
entering a new network is largely uncertain. 
However, we underscore that information is the 
critical resource that generates strategic flexibility 
to recognize and capture project values hidden in 
dynamic uncertainties. Actually, since information 
is a critical resource in uncertain environments, the 
main benefit of entry into a new network through 
M&A deals is that it provides a platform for future 
strategies. 
The second class of synergies in R&D - fairly 
common in M&A operations aimed at filling 
technology gaps - is achieved through learning and 
developing new technologies (Link, 1988; Capasso 
and Meglio, 2005; Graebner et al., 2010). Makri, 
Hitt and Lane (2010) find that similarities between 
firms in knowledge facilitate incremental renewal, 
while complementarities would make 
discontinuous strategic transformations more 
likely. Nonetheless, M&A may shape new 
capabilities by integrating existing and new 
resources that were previously unrelated; the 
phenomena tend to have a high impact when the 
M&A implements a related diversification 
strategy. In fact, according to Finkelstein and 
Haleblian (2002), routines and practices developed 
in one firm transfer to other firms through business 
combination operations on the basis of the degree 
of similarity of industrial environments from which 
they proven. However, organizational learning 
thought M&A deals is extremely difficult 
(Barkema and Schijven, 2008; Hitt et al., 2009) 
vis-à-vis alliances (Dagnino et al., 2012).  
This second class of synergies is typical of 
M&As between large firms and small firms, in 
which the big corporation has considerable 
commercial and productive resources focused on 
marginal innovations. Conversely, the small firm is 
really innovative. In this perspective, M&As may 
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play a role in reducing the time to generate an 
innovation and the appropriation of value from it 
(Mocciaro Li Destri and Dagnino, 2012) 
The appreciation of the R&D synergies is 
extremely complex (especially in international 
M&A). In fact, the level of technological 
knowledge gained by the two firms separately 
results partly from the ability to absorb knowledge 
from outside and partly from internal R&D, so 
appreciation of the technological quality of 
synergies as the fundamental driver of value 
creation in M&A should be assessed in 
relationship to the possibility of recombination of 
knowledge and technology (Bresman et al., 1999).  
Finally, a complex synergy to gain is the 
possibility that M&A deals can increase invention 
in new areas. M&As may foster the generation of 
future choices and potential for proprietary access 
to outcomes (McGrath et al., 2004). This 
hypothesis underscores that operating in distant 
markets increases a firm’s knowledge of its 
resources’ various possible utilizations, thereby 
generating new expansions possibilities. In this 
perspective, M&A deals are a way to create new 
possibilities for future efficiency. It supports the 
capacity to learn how to alter the resource 
configuration in adaptation to market changes. In 
this case, the uncertainties underlying the estimate 
of potential synergies increase significantly, 
making it crucial to use precautionary criteria of 
estimation. Precautionary criteria have also to 
consider that, generally, M&A have a positive 
effect on patenting output, but decrease patent 
impact, originality, and generality (Valentini, 
2012). 
 
3.6 Synergies Generated in the Financial 
Function 
 
Since combinations of firms can improve the risk 
profile of business combinations, the finance 
function is a source of synergies in M&A deals. In 
an M&A context, the variables that reduce the 
level of risk connected to the firm are the larger 
size of the resulting corporation firm and, possibly, 
higher degree of diversification. Conversely, risk 
increases whenever operating and financial 
leverage ratios increase rending the firm more rigid 
(Schweitzer et al., 1992). It is important to 
understand if reductions in the risk factors are 
offset (or more than offset) by increases in firm 
financial or operational rigidity.  
Since a conglomerate’s corporate office can 
allow for a higher level of indebtedness (Lewellen, 
1971; Picone, 2012) and advantages of 
deductibility interests, a lower cost of debt capital 
may emerge as result of M&A operation.  
In the case of acquisitions, it is also important 
for the estimation of the WACC to consider a 
discount associated with the obstruction in the 
deliberative assemblies that minority shareholders 
could implement if they are excluded from any of 
the benefits available to majority shareholders. 
 
4. THE NATURE OF SYNERGIES  
 
In the preceding section, we identified the sources 
of synergies, using Porter’ value chain to map 
them function by function. Moving from these 
findings, we can classify potential synergies on the 
basis of their nature and, in particular, their mode 
of emergence. Following the classification 
illustrated above, there are three types of synergies: 
- the value of incremental cash flow synergies 
that M&A deals generate (SF); 
- the value of the real options synergies that 
M&A deals generate (SO); and 
- the value determined by changes in the firms’ 
risk profile as a result of M&A (SR). 
Regarding the classification of synergies 
between differential flows or real options, we find 
a criterion in the distinction between tangible and 
intangible resources and the degree of innovation 
entailed by the integration process. The emergence 
of synergies from material resources, under the 
organizational and technological compatibility, 
through the generation of cash flow is relatively 
straight forward to asses. In contrast, the 
emergence of synergies regarding intangible 
resources can be highly uncertain. Accordingly, in 
the first case, the synergy benefits should be 
evaluated by discounting the cash flows at a rate 
whose level reflects the risk profile associated with 
the businesses combination. In the second case, it 
is better to refer to the option pricing models 
developed by modern financial theory, since they 
take into account the higher profile of uncertainty 
to which this type of synergies is subject. In this 
case, the “discounted cash flow approach in itself 
is insufficient and therefore, the options framework 
is a valuable tool-kit not only for analysts but also 
for the decision-makers in the top management of 
the firm” (Krishnamurti and Vishwanath, 2008: 
139). Real option synergies underscore that an 
M&A deal may create economic value using the 
combination of scarce resources to undertake a 
potential opportunity in the environment 
(Andrews, 1971; Chatterjee, 1986). However, the 
evaluation of these synergies makes sense only if 
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in the future there the conditions for their 
realization exists or at least is likely to be fulfilled.  
Finally, the synergies determined by changes in 
the corporations’ risk profile as a result of the 
M&A (SR) and computed according to the rules of 
finance should be considered in the definition of 
the WACC discount rate. This practice is 
consistent with the nature of SR (i.e. the risk of a 
quality variable); consequently, it is estimated 
indirectly. 
 
Table 1: Matrix of the main synergies 
Market power Sharing tangible resources Sharing intangible resources 
- increased bargaining power 
toward suppliers 
- increased bargaining power 
toward commercial distribution 
- increased bargaining power 
toward customers 
 
  
 
- rationalization of corporate 
structure (production and 
administration) 
- reduction of vertical integration 
costs 
- technological economies 
- reduction of inventories 
- economies of plant 
- economies of scale 
- economies of scope 
 
Low degree of innovation 
 
- economies of scale for marketing 
function 
- streamlining the sales network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High degree of innovation 
 
- mode of access to new distribution 
channels 
- mode of entry into innovative 
networks 
- mode of learning technology 
- invention of new sectors 
- developing markets in poorly 
staffed and brand extension 
strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
New risk profile (SR) 
 
5. A MODEL OF SYNERGIES ASSESSMENT 
IN M&A DEALS 
 
The previous section offered a categorization of 
the sources of synergy and how to assess them. 
Obviously, the total value of the synergies in an 
M&A operation is the result of their sum. In 
particular, we have designed a method that 
considers jointly the DCF techniques - to measure 
SF and SR - and the Real Option technique - to 
evaluate SO. The two approaches of financial 
theory allow us to add values determined 
separately, because they share the same heuristic 
purpose, which is to summarize the potential value 
of the complex results from a combination of 
firms.  
The methodology assumes the asset 
perspective, considering the WACC rate 
adjustment for the effects of debt (which we call 
WACC**). We justify this choice because of the 
need for agility, speed, and synthesis for the 
selection of the target firm.  
In this section, we focus our attention on the 
addition of formula [7]. Indicates the change in 
value of total debt.  
 Simplistically, we can rewrite the [6] 
formula as:  
[7]
)ΔDD(D)SSS()WW(W ABBAROFBAAB 
, 
 
5.1 Estimating the Incremental Cash Flows 
 
SF 
 
SO 
SF 
SF 
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The strategic plan of an M&A operation should 
explain how the resources and skills will be 
recombined to obtain market rents or economies in 
costs. We distinguish between post-acquisition 
synergies (or immediate), which are the result of 
the new asset allocation (for example, the sale of a 
plant unnecessarily duplicated as a result of the 
operation of M&A), synergies achievable within 
the time horizon of the plan, for which it is 
possible to elaborate analytical predictions; and 
potential synergies beyond the term of the plan. It 
is not possible to analytically estimate the better 
synergies; rather they can be estimated only on 
average.  
The value of incremental cash flows may be 
calculated as follows: 
 
[8] 
**
t**
AB
t
1i
i**
AB i
F
WACC
)WACC)(1Δ(FCFO
)WACC(1
)Δ(FCFO
S










 , 
 
where Δ (FCFOiAB) indicates the differential 
operating cash flow of the businesses combination 
estimated analytically; Δ (FCFOAB) indicates the 
average differential operating cash flow of the 
businesses combination from the time t on; and 
WACC** represents the weighted average cost of 
capital of the businesses combination. 
 
5.2 Estimating Real Options Synergies 
 
As illustrated earlier, M&A operations may create 
value by enhancing the degree of fine flexibility 
and adaptability to external changes. Given the 
uncertainty connected to these synergies, the DCF 
evaluation method is inappropriate. However, real 
option theory is able to evaluate the business 
combinations’ capacity to “identify major changes 
in the external environment, quickly commit 
resources to new courses of action in response to 
those changes, and recognize and act promptly 
when it is time to halt or reverse existing resource 
commitments” (Shimizu and Hitt, 2004). Using the 
formula proposed by Black-Scholes model 
adjusted for dividends, the value of a real option is 
given by: 
[9] )N(dKe)N(dSeO 2
rt
1
yt   . 
where S is the present value of the potential 
development project; K is the initial investment 
necessary for the development of the project; R 
indicates the risk-free interest rate corresponding to 
the duration of the option; T is the time to 
expiration in years; Y indicates the instantaneous 
rate of dividend; and N (d1) and N (d2) are 
functions corresponding to the cumulative normal 
distribution to standard normal variables, 
respectively: 
 
tσ
t
2
σ
y -r
K
S
ln 
d
2
1














  e tσdd 12  ; 
 
where σ2 is the variance of the natural logarithm 
of the value of the underlying asset. 
It is important to stress that several problems 
may arise. The first is the difficulty of estimating 
all variables of the new investment and their 
capability to generate cash flow. Second, the 
evaluation of real options requires a cautious 
approach. The evaluation is justified by the 
possibility of creating sustainable competitive 
advantages in the long run. If the process of 
evaluation is repeated for all p flexibility options 
that the operation of M&A generates, we have the 
value of SO. 
 
[10]   
 
 
p
1h
p
1h
h 2
rt
1
yt
hO )N(dKe)N(dSeOS . 
 
5.3 Estimating the Synergies that Emerge from 
a Different Risk Profile 
 
Finally, we must proceed to estimate the synergies 
that arise from the different risk profiles. We 
compare the value of firms under the assumption 
of unity of the economic entity (businesses 
combination) and the value of firms under 
situations of managerial independence (as before 
the extraordinary operation), i.e., standalone firms. 
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We can formalize the evaluation of synergies that emerge from a different risk profile as follows: 
 
[11]
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where FCFOiA, FCFOiB are respectively the 
operating cash flows of firm A and firm B in year 
i; FCFOA, FCFOB are respectively the average 
operating cash flow of the firm A and the firm B 
from t on; and DA and DB are the economic value 
of the debts of the firm A and of the firm B. 
The WACC of A and B before the M&A 
transaction is adjusted on the basis of the 
procedure in order to keep the tax benefits of debt 
into account. 
Simplifying the above expression, we have: 
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Estimating the Total Value of Synergy (SF) 
To find a synthesis of all the expressions obtained, we proceed to combine [7], [8], [10] and [12]: 
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From this formula, we derive the following compact formula: 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper offers a systematic analysis of the 
sources of the synergies that can emerge in a M&A 
deal, “mapping” function by function and 
categorizing the synergies on the basis of their 
emergence. Moving from the idea that, if the 
strategy is unclear, there is no reason for a firm to 
make on M&A deal (Bower, 2001), this analysis 
provides the fundamentals for the subsequent 
development of a methodology for estimating 
different classes of synergies. We make clear the 
hidden potential of a generic M&A. A proper 
assessment of options for external growth is not 
possible without appreciating strategic and 
organizational aspects on the basis of the 
estimation of the differential cash flows related to 
synergies, the impact of M&A on the risk profile 
of businesses combination and, finally, without 
taking into due consideration the options that the 
operation of M&A can generate in terms of 
operational and strategic flexibility. The extent of 
synergies not included in traditional evaluation 
formula is therefore an issue that bridges the gap 
between strategy and finance, as it requires a 
unified view of phenomena and key operational 
processes found in M&A.  
The benefits related to a methodology of 
assessment of synergies in M&A transactions are 
numerous, and extend far beyond the proper 
definition of the price fixed through negotiation 
between the parties. In particular, these additional 
benefits include: 
- a template to support the selection of the 
target firm (Mitchell and Shaver, 2003). The 
measure of potential synergies allows us to 
compare different candidate firms. Thus, the 
evaluation model proposed may support 
management decision-making (Cobblah et al., 
2010); 
- a support for the processes of planning and 
management of the integration between the firms 
(Zollo and Singh, 2004; Schweiger and Lipper, 
2005; Dagnino and Pisano, 2008; Teerikangas et 
al., 2011) since the value of synergies becomes a 
“strategic goal” and, hence, the instrument to guide 
the process of integration between the firms; and 
- the definition of a premium of acquisition 
consistent with the value of potential synergies, the 
payment of the premium (Chang, 1998), and the 
management of the financial structure (Lewellen et 
al., 1995; Maloney et al., 1993) of the corporations 
as a result of the M&A. 
This paper gives no specific solutions to a 
limited number of aspects of the proposed 
methodology for the estimation of synergies, 
which may represent areas of interest for further 
research on the topic. More research needs to be 
done to examine on methods - qualitative and 
quantitative information – to accurate the 
estimation of the unlevered cost of equity of the 
combining firms. In this perspective, we recall also 
the need to develop rigorous algorithms for 
correction of the rate to discount cash flows to 
consider tax benefits, the costs of (so-called) 
financial stress, and control costs.  
Finally, the applicability of financial options 
techniques asks new investigations on applicable 
principles of option pricing theory in real contexts. 
While Black-Scholes’ formula is appropriate to 
assess the value of a financial investments, the 
application of Black-Scholes’ formula in real 
context violates some theoretical assumptions, e.g. 
the lognormal distribution of the project values. On 
the other hand, empirical estimation of the inputs 
in Black-Scholes’ formula is really complex, for 
example the volatility is not easy to estimate.  
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